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The federal Endangered Species Act 
of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543, is our 
primary national bulwark against the 
destruction of the biological diversity on 
which ecosystems depend. The most 
f~r-reaching of the Act's protections is the 
prohibition against taking in section 9 of the 
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538. 
The prohibition against taking flatly forbids 
any entity, public or private, from "taking" any 
designated species of endangered wildlife. 
"Taking" includes any act that causes death or 
injury to any member of an endangered 
species, even death or injury that results 
indirectly from habitat modification. The 
section 9 taking prohibition is a powerful law, 
but has never been fully enforced. 
In 1982, Congress amended the 
Endangered Species Act and added two 
exceptions to the taking prohibition, one for 
"incidental" takings resulting from federal 
actions, in sections 7(b)(4) and 7(o)(2) of the 
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4) & (o)(2), and 
one for "incidental" takings resulting from all 
other actions, in section lO(a) of the Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 1539(a). These exceptions are 
intended to allow limited takings of 
endangered species while preventing injury to 
the species as a whole. The capacity of these 
exceptions to achieve this goal is still 
unproved. However, the existence of the 
exceptions offers new reasons ·tO enforce the 
section 9 taking prohibition. 
A The Section 9 Taking Proh.ibition 
The taking prohibition embodied in 
section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 
1973 is simple, unambiguous and breathtaking 
in its scope. Endangered Species Act 
sections 9(a)(1)(B)&(C), 16 U.S.C.' 
§1538(a)(l)(B)&(C), forbid anyone to "take~ 
any member of any endangered species of fish 
or wildlife "within the United States or the 
territorial seas of the United States" or "upon 
the high seas.'' Section 2(19), 16 U.S.C. 
§1531(19), defines "take" as "to harass, harm, 
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, 
or collect, or· to attempt to engage in any 
such conduct." The term take was defined "in 
the broadest possible manner to include every 
conceivable way in which a person can 'take' 
or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife." S. 
Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973). 
The United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service ("USFWS"), which is responsible for 
enforcing the Endangered Species Act for 
almost all endangered species, has defined 
"harass" and "harm" in the definition of "take" 
to include indirect injury through habitat 
destruction or modification. USFWS defines 
"harm" to include an "act" that results in 
"significant habitat modification or 
degradation where it actually kills or injures 
wildlife by significantly impairing essential 
behavior patterns." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c). 
USFWS defines "harass" to include an 
"intentional or negligent act or omission" that 
creates "the likelihood of injury to wildlife by 
annoying it to such an extent as to 
significantly disrupt normal behavioral 
patterns." Id. The broad USFWS 
definitions accurately reflect Congressional 
intent. The House committee report on the 
1973 Jaw contemplated that the prohibition 
against harassment would · allow federal 
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agencies "to regulate or prohibit the activities 
of birdwatchers where the effect of those 
activities might disturb the birds and make it 
difficult for them to hatch or raise their 
young." H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 11 (1973). 
The provisions of the section 9 taking 
prohibition can be enforced either by federal 
government action or by citizen suit. See 16 
U.S.C. § 1540(e) & (g). The statute 
encourages citizen suits with a generous fee 
shifting provision. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)( 4). 
The federal government may bring criminal 
prosecutions for "knowing" violations of the 
prohibition. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1). The 
section 9 taking prohibition makes it a 
violation of federal law for anyone to harm or 
injure or attempt to harm or injure any 
member of any endangered animal species 
anywhere in the United States, on public land 
or private land, or on the high seas. For 
these reasons, section 9 is, perhaps, the most 
powerful piece of wildlife legislation in the 
world. 
Recent cases demonstrate the power 
and versatility of the section 9 taking 
prohibition. See, ~ Palila v. Hawaii 
Department of Land and Natural Resources, 
471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979) aff'd 639 
F.2d .495 (9th Cir. 1981 )(holding that 
defendants had "taken" the endangered Palila 
bird in violation of section 9 by maintaining 
feral sheep and goats that ·degraded the 
mamane-niao forest on which the Pali!a 
depends and ordering the removal of the 
feral sheep and goats from Palila habitat); 
Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and 
Natural Resources, (Palila TI), 649 F. Supp. 
1070 (D .. Hawaii 1986) aff'd 852 F.2d 1106 
(9th Cir. 1988)( holding that defendants had 
"taken" the Palila by maintaining a population 
of mouflon sheep in the mamane-niao forest); 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 688 F . 
. Supp. 1334 (D. MiJ1n. 1?88) aff'd 882 F.2d 
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1294 (8th Cir. 1989)( holding that EPA's 
continuing approval of above-ground use of 
pesticides containing strychnine or strychnine 
sulfate was a "takint because it indirectly 
resulted in the poisoning of "non-target" 
endangered species); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 
F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988) on appeal 
88-6041 (5th Cir.)(holding that U.S. Forest 
Service timber management on national 
forests in Texas was a ntaking" of the 
endangered Red-Cockaded Woodpecker· 
because it degraded and fragmented 
Red-Cockaded Woodpecker habitat). See 
also National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 23 
E.R.C. 1089 (E.D. Cal. 1985). 
B. Enforcement of the Section 9 Taking 
Prohibition 
Section 9 of the Endangered Species 
Act is a statutory provision with teeth, a law 
intended to be a powerful tool in a national 
effort to preserve the biological diversity on 
which ecosystems, and therefore all of us, 
depend. Unfortunately, section 9 has never 
been fully enforced. Despite the handful of 
cases demonstrating its power, an apparently 
general reluctance to invoke the far-reaching 
language of section 9 taking prohibition has 
relegated it to a subsidiary role in 
Endangered Species Act litigation, a satellite 
to the more limited substantive provisions of 
Endangered Species Act section 7. 
A striking example of a failure to 
enforce section 9 appears in the Fifth 
Circuit's recent consideration of the adequacy 
of regulations to limit takings of sea turtles 
caused by shrimping. In State of Louisiana 
ex ref Guste v. Veritv, 853 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 
1988), the court upheld the challenged 
regulations while· ignoring the legal 
ramifications of the fact that sea turtles are 
being taken. The court considered the 
evidence of how many turtles are being killed 
in shrimp nets. The court observed that "the 
relationship of shrimping to sea turtle ' . ' 
mortality is strongly demonstrated" and 
estimated that 2,381 threatened or 
. endangered turtles are killed by shrimpers 
each year off Louisiana alone. But the court 
failed to consider whether this mass killing 
violated the section 9 taking prohibition. 
The unwillingness to enforce the 
section 9 taking prohibition fully has distorted 
the law of endangered species, creating a 
system of unequal justice in which some 
groups and individuals are taken to court for 
acts that would go unquestioned if committed 
by others. The State of Hawaii is ordered to 
remove feral sheep and goats from the 
habitat of the endangered Palila, while the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has difficulty 
enforcing any habitat protections for the 
endangered 'Aiala, or Hawaiian crow, on 
private land. The United States Forest 
Service is forced to preserve adequate habitat 
for the endangered Red-Cockaded 
Woodpecker, while private timber companies 
have been free to log in woodpecker habitat. 
This distortion of the law limits the 
protection available to endangered species 
and creates the impression that the law is 
unfair. If left uncorrected, it could erode our 
national commitment to preserving biological 
diversity and biological diversity_ itself. · 
C. Exceptions to the Taking Prohibition 
The general reluctance to enforce the 
section 9 taking prohibition has grown, in 
large part, out of a perception that the 
prohibition was draconian, that it lacked the 
flexibility necessary to avoid injustice in 
specific cases. However, the 1982 
amendments to sections 7(b)(4), 7(o)(2) and 
lO(a) of the Endangered Species Act have 
given USFWS and the National Marine 
Fisheries Service ("NMFS"), the agencies that 
administer the Act, discretion to fashion 
exceptions to the ~aking prohibition to 
prevent injustice that might b~ caused by full 
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enforcement. 
First, sections 7(b)(4) and 7(o)(2) 
together authorize USFWS and NMFS to 
include "incidental take statements" as part of 
biological opinions rendered for federal 
agencies through the Endangered Species Act 
section 7 consultation process. Section 7 
consultation is intended to insure that actions 
authorized, funded or carried out by federal · 
agencies will not jeopardize the continued 
existence of any threatened or endangered 
species. These "statements" allow a federal 
agency or an applicant for federal 
authorization or funding, planning to engage 
in an action that is not likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of a species, to take 
members o[ that species if the taking is not 
the purpose of the action. 
Second, section 10(a) allows USFWS 
or NMFS to issue "incidental take permits" 
for non-federal actions that might otherwise 
violate the section 9 taking prohibition, if the 
incidental taking "will not appreciably reduce 
the likelihood of the survival and recovery of 
the species in the wild." These exceptions to 
the taking prohibitjon were provided under 
explicitly limited conditions designed to 
prevent harm to the species as a whole. 
Without amending section 9 itself, the 
1982 amendments transformed the taking 
prohibition from an inflexible rule against 
almost all takings into instrument which can 
be used to force entities, public or private, 
whose activities might harm endangered 
specjes, into the section 7 or section 10 
administrative process, processes designed to 
resolve conflicts between species preservation 
and development or other potentially harmful 
activities. Eight years a_fter their enactment, 
the effect of these ·exceptions is only 
beginning to be felt. 
1. 7(b)4)/7(o)C2) Incidental Take 
"Statements" 
Section 7(b)(4) of the Endangered 
Species Act provides that if, after consultation 
on a federal action under section 7, USFWS 
or NMFS concludes: (A) that the action 
subject to consultation will not jeopardize the 
species or recommends a "reasonable and 
prudent alternative" that will prevent 
jeopardy, and (B) that the taking "incidental" 
to the action is not likely to jeopardize the 
species, then USFWS or NMFS "shall" 
provide the federal agenc.,"Y with a "written 
statement" that: 
(i) specifies the impact of the incidental 
taking on the species; 
(ii) specifies the "reasonable and prudent 
measures" that USFWS or NMFS considers 
"necessary and appropriate" to minimize that 
impact, 
(iii) in the case of marine mammals, specifies 
those me.asures that are necessary to comply 
with the Marine Ma'mmal Protection Act, and 
(iv) sets forth "the terms and conditions ... 
that must be complied with by the Federal 
agency or applicant (if any) or both, to 
implement the measures specified under 
clauses (ii) and (iii)." 
Section 7(o)(2) provides, 
"[n]otwithstanding" section 9, that ''any taking" 
that complies with the "terms and conditions" 
of an incidental take statement provided 
under "subsection [7](b )( 4)(iv) ... shall not 
be considered to be a prohibited taking of 
the species concerned." 
Although sections 7(b)(4) and 
7(o)(2) together allow actions authorized, 
funded or carried out by a federal agency to 
go forward even when they will kill or injure 
members of an endangered species, sections 
7(b )( 4) and 7( o )(2) are intended to ensure 
that the taking they authorize will not 
jeopardize the continued existence of the 
species and that everything that can be ctQne 
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"reasonably" and "prudently" to protect the 
species is done. The explicit conditions 
required for a valid incidental take statement 
make it plain that Congress did not intend to 
simply exempt federal agencies from section 
9's requirements. 
The section 7(b)(4)n(o)(2) exception 
·offers federal agencies a mechanism through 
which they can shield themselves from the 
section 9 taking prohibition in most cases. 
·Whenever either USFWS or NMFS issues a 
"no jeopardy" biological opinion under section 
7 of the Endangered Species Act, and that 
agency anticipates incidental taking as a result 
of the contemplated action, the agency should 
also issue an incidental take statement. See 
Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA 882 F.2d 1294, 
1301 (8th Cir. 1989)(holding that a 
"statement" cannot operate retroactively), 
National Wildlife Federation v, National Park 
Service, 669 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 
1987)(holding that "statement" is not required 
when no taking is anticipated); National 
Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 23 E.R.C. 1089 
(E.D. Cal. 1985)( holding that a "statement" 
must contain reasonable and prudent 
mitigation measures and cannot operate 
retroactively); see also American Littoral 
Societv v. Herndon, 720 F. Supp. 942, 948-49 
(S.D. Fla. 1988). 
2. Section lO(a) Incidental Take 
"Permits" 
Section 10(a) provides that "the Secretary 
[NMFS or USFWS] may permit under such 
terms and . conditions as he shall prescribe .. 
. any laking otherwise prohibited by section 
1538(a)(l)(B) (the section 9 provision 
prohibiting takings within the United States 
and its territorial waters] ... if the taking is 
incidental to, and not the purpose of, the 
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." 
Section lO(a) allows non-federal entities, not 
subject to section 7 of the Endangered 
Species Act and therefore not eligible for a 
7(b )( 4)/7( o )(2) exception, to get permits for 
"incidental takings." While many of its 
requirements are very similar to those of the 
7(b )( 4)/7( o )(2) exception, its provisions are 
more detailed, more time consuming, and 
potentially more stringent. 
To get a section lO(a) incidental 
take permit an "applicant" must submit a 
"conservation plan" to the agency charged 
with protecting the species, USFWS or 
NMFS. The required "conservation plan" 
must specify: 
(i) the impact that will likely resull from such 
taking; 
(ii) what steps the applicant will take to 
minimize and mitigate such impacts, and the 
funding that will be available to implement 
such steps; 
(iii) what alternative actions to such taking 
the applicant considered and the reasons why 
such alternatives are not being utilized; and 
(iv) such other measures that the Secretary 
may require as being necessary or appropriate 
for purposes of the plan. 
Once USFWS or NMFS receives a 
"conservation plan," an "opportunity for public 
comment, with respect to the permit 
application and the related conservation plan" 
must be provided. 
After reviewing the plan and 
considering public comment, the agency 
"shall" issue a permit if it finds: 
(i) the taking will be incidental 
(ii) the applicant will, to th~ maximum extent 
practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts 
of such taking; 
(iii) the applicant will assure that adequate 
funding for the plan will be provided; 
(iv) the taking will not appreciably reduce the 
likelihood of the survival and recovery of the 
species in the wild; 
(v) the measures, .if any, .required under. 
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subparagraph (A)(iv) [measures the Secretary 
finds necessary or appropriate] will be met. 
The permitting agency may also require 
"assurances" that the plan will be 
implemented and may impose ~reporting 
requirements" in the permit. The agency 
"shall" revoke the permit if the permittee is 
not complying with its "terms or conditions." · 
The legislative history of section lO(a) 
shows that tbe broad statutory language 
authorizing USFWS or NMFS to impose 
permit conditions as it deems "necessary or 
appropriate" was part of an attempt to 
prompt both agencies and permit applicants 
to widen their horiwns: to consider 
protecting unlisted species and ecosystems as 
a whole as well as listed endangered species. 
The explicitly contemplated quid pro quo for 
taking the broad view in conservation 
planning was "long-term assurances to the 
proponent of the conservation plan that the 
terms of the plan will be adhered to and that 
further mitigation requirements will only be 
imposed in accordance with the terms of the 
plan." See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 835, 97th 
Cong. 2d Sess. 30-31 (1982). The comments 
accompanying publication of the proposed 
Fish and Wildlife Service regulations 
implementing section lO(a). contemplate 
permits "of 30 or more years duration" but 
recognize that provision must be made for 
changing circumstances. 48 Fed. Reg.31417, 
31418 (July 8, 1983). 
To illustrate how a long-term conservation 
plan should work, the House conference 
committee singled out the. habitat 
conservation plan then being prepared to 
protect the habitat of three species, including 
the endangered Mission Blue Butterfly on 
San Bruno Mountain in San Mateo County, 
California. The committee report stated thnt 
"the San Bruno Mountain plan is the model 
for tbis long-term permit~ and that "the 
adequacy of similar conservation plans should 
be measured against the San Bruno plan." 
Unlike 7(b)(4)n(o)(2) "statement", 
section lO(a) taking "permits" have only been 
issued in a handful of cases: Delano, 
California Habitat Conservation Plan (permit 
issued January 1990); The Coachella Valley, 
California Habitat Conservation PUm for the 
Coachella Valley Fringe-Toed Lizard (permit 
issued 1986); The San Bruno Mountain, 
California Habitat Conservation Plan (permit 
issued 1983). However, as many as thirty 
more conservation plans are currently on the 
drawing board (~. The Balcones 
Canyonlands (Austin, Texas Regional) Habitat 
Conservation Plan; The Riverside County, 
California Stephens Kangaroo Rat Habitat 
Conservation Plan. 
A lO(a) permit has been challenged 
only once in court and that court test may 
have little relevance for future challenges to 
conservation plans because it was ·a challenge 
to the same San Bruno plan that Congress 
had praised in drafting the section lO(a) 
legislation, the plan against which all other 
plans were to be measured. Friends of 
Endangered Species v. Jantzen 596 F. Supp. 
518 (N.D. Cal. 1984) afrd 760 F.2d 976 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (upholding the San Bruno Plan 
because: (1) Congress had considered the San 
Bruno plan as a "paradigm" for section lO(a) 
conservation plans; (2) USFWS had 
determined that the plan would enhance the 
habitat of the Mission Blue Butterfly; (3) 
USFWS had considered expert opinion and 
public comment before issuing the incidental 
take permit; and ( 4) the taking permit was 
subject to revocation or reconsideration if 
significant new information emerged). 
The San Bruno Plan permanently 
protected 86% of the Mission Blue Butterfly 
habitat and provided for habitat enhancement. 
Unfortunately, it is exceptional. The 
conservation plan desi~ned to prot':!ct the 
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Coachella Valley Fringe-Toed Lizard protects 
only 11% to 25% of its remaining habitat. 
The proposed Stephens Kangaroo Rat 
conservation plan, in Riverside County, 
California, would permit the destruction of 
20% of the remaining occupied habitat of the 
species (about 4,000 acres) while protecting 
about the same amount. The recently 
: approved Delano, California conservation plan 
· allows the permanent destruction of 287 acres 
'.of habitat for three endangered species in 
· return for the acquisition and fencing of 514 
acres of habitat elsewhere. No other phm 
currently in place will achieve nearly the level 
of comprehensive protection required by the 
San Bruno plan. 
Individuals involved with endangered 
species issues have reservations about the 
ability of the section lO(a) process to protect 
endangered species. Dr. Craig Pease: 
involved in the biological assessment for the 
Balcones Canyonlands (Austin Regional) 
Habitat Conservation Plan, notes that the 
compromise process required for the 
development of lO(a) conservation plans 
quickly precludes bold solutions to habitat 
conservation problems. Telephone interview, 
Craig Pease (February 2, 1990). John W. 
Thompson, a member of the Society of 
American Foresters, concerned with 
Red-Cockaded Woodpecker habitat 
conservation on private lands, observes that 
the lO(a) process creates ~too big a 
temptation for bureaucrats who think their 
job is to issue permits." Telephone interview, 
John W. Thompson (February 2, 1990). 
William Bunch, an attorney representing 
Texas Earth First! in the Balcones 
Canyonlands (Austin Regional) Habitat 
Conservation Plan process believes that the 
value of the lO(a) process remains to be 
seen. Telephone interview, William Bunch 
(March 1, 1990). 
USFWS officials charged with 
implementing the process are also concerned,. 
but more often about the lack of any 
provision for interim taking permits while 
long range conservation plans are being 
prepared. Telephone interview, James 
Bartell, USFWS Sacramento, (March 14, 
1990); Telephone interview, Joseph Johnston, 
USFWS, Fort Worth, (March 12, 1990); 
Telephone interview Peter Stine, USFWS, 
Ventura, (February 15, 1990). 
As the 1988 Endangered Species 
Act Report of the United States General 
Accounting Office noted concerning the San 
Bruno Plan: 
While FWS officials we spoke to generally 
view the 1982 amendments as a valuable tool 
to allow development while rece1vmg 
concessions nod funding from developers to 
protect the species, a local [San Francisco) 
conservation group views the amendments as 
'a dangerous loophole to the original intent 
of the Endangered Species Act ... 
United States General Accounting Office, 
Endangered Species: Management 
Improvements Could Enhance Recovery 
Program, 43 (December 1988). 
On the bright side, the 10(a) 
process lias prompted some of the creativity 
and "ecosystem thinkint it was intended to 
encourage. The currently proposed Balcones 
CanyonJands (Austin Regional) Habitat 
Conservation Plan is being designed to 
protect the habitat of the officially 
endangered Black-Capped Verio, the as yet 
unlisted Golden-cheeked Warbler, two rare 
but unlisted plants and an entire biota of 
cave invertebrates, some of which are listed 
as endangered but many of which have, not 
yet even been formally identified. The 
Balcones Canyonlands Plan demonstrates the 
possible promise of using the 10(a) permit 
process to fashion ecosystem-based 
endangered species protection. 
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D. Conclusion: Exceptions and Enforcement 
of the Taking Prohibition 
Recent developments demonstrate that it 
is too early to draw any general conclusions 
about the effect of either the 7(b )( 4)n( o )(2) 
or lO(a) exceptions to the section 9 taking 
prohibition. However, regardless of their . 
intrinsic value, their existence radically alters 
the policy considerations for enforcing the 
section 9 taking prohibition. Before 1982, 
the taking prohibition was, for the most part, 
unconditional. If an action were going to kill 
or injure a member of an endangered species, 
that action was illegal. In contrast, after 
1982, any enti~, public or private, federal or 
non-federal, can seek to shield almost any 
contemplated action from the taking 
prohibition, so long as the action will not 
threaten the existence of an endangered 
species as a whole. 
The existence of the 1982 exceptions .to 
the taking prohibition supports three 
arguments in favor of full enforcement of the 
section 9 taking prohibition. First, the 
exceptions make enforcement more palatable 
because they give potential violators an 
opportunity to shield themselves from liability. 
If a public or private entity ignores the 
exception process, created for its benefit by 
the 1982 amendments, and goes ahead with 
an action that may kill or injure members of 
an endangered species, then it has brought 
section 9 liability upon itself and is in no 
position to complain if it is enjoined, fined or 
jailed. In other words, full enforcement of 
the taking prohibition is fair. 
Second, enforcement of the taking 
prohibition works to force those whose 
actions may harm endangered species to 
engage in the administrative process cr~ated 
by the exceptions -- a process in which 
federal agency expertise potentially can limit 
the danger to endangered species and resolve 
conflicts between endangered species and · 
contemplated actions. This is far preferable, 
for everyone, to the high stakes game of 
"chicken" that results when an entity 
undertakes an action that is potenti11lly 
harmful to an endangered species because it 
gambles that no one else has the information, 
resources, or desire to sue to stop that action. 
In other words, full enforcement will force 
potential violators to use the exception 
processes. 
Third, the key to preserving 
endangered species is preserving the 
ecosystems on which they depend. Congress 
intended that the exceptions to the taking 
prohibition should encourage creative 
solutions to endangered species preservation 
problems, solutions that, among other things, 
consider the welfare of the ecosystem as a 
whole. Obviously, these creative solutions 
cannot be formulated, much less 
implemented, unless the section 9 taking 
prohibition provides a credible threat to 
potential violators: A threat that failure to 
put up the time, energy and money involved 
in formulating and implementing creative 
solutions, will result in much greater 
expenditures of time, energy and money 
fighting a section 9 taking suit. The 
encouraging Balcones Canyonlands (Austin 
Regional) Habitat Conservation plan is. in 
part, the result of letters of intent to sue 
under section 9 filed by Texas Earth First! 
In other words, enforcement \viii make the 
exception processes work for the benefit of 
species and their ecosystems. 
Much of the past reluctance to 
enforce th'e section 9 prohibition appears to 
have grown out of perceptions that the 
prohibition was inflexible, perceptions formed 
before the 1982 amendments created the two 
exception processes. Those amendments 
changed the section 9 prohibition from an 
unconditional prohjbition into a tool for 
forcing reluctant public and. private entities to 
engage in the administrative process designed 
4 ,11 244 
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to protect. endangered species and their 
ecosystems. The prohjbition functions best in 
that role if fully enforced. 
